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Partial Retirement and the Analysis of Rtirement Behavior
ABS TRACT
This paper examines the phenomenon of partial retirement. Topics
covered include: (1) the quantitative importance of partialretirement,
(2) institutional constraints in addition to mandatory retirement which
limit the opportunity to retire partially in the main job, (3) the effect
of these constraints on the specification of the relevant structuralequa-
tions in a life cycle retirement model, (4) the impact of standard explan-
atory variables on four outcomes ——completeretirement, partial retirement
both in and outside the main job, and non—retirement, (5) theimportance
of partial retirement even for those who do not face mandatory retirement,
are not covered by a pension and are healthy, (6) the sensitivity of
results based on a dichotomous retirement variable to whether thepar-
tially retired are classified as retired or not retired.
A number of studies have either treated partial retirement inappro-
priately or have adopted unrealistic assumptions about the opportunity
set facing potential retirees. Our findings call their results into
question.






(603) 646—2531Between full—time workandcomplete retirement, many individuals
passthrough a state of partial retirement. Some of these older workers
reduce their work effort in the same jobs they held as prime age workers,
itmanymorepartiallyretireby takinganother job. Much previous
workhas either ignored ormistreatedthis phenomenon of partial retire-
ment. In this paper we will document the important of partial retirement
andconsidera number ofconsequencesof inappropriately analyzing its
role in the retirement decision.
Much ofour effortis aimed at answering six questions andproviding
related information pertaining to partial retirement. The six questions
areas follows:
1. How importantis partial retirement, both in absolute terms and
relative to full retirement and non-retirement?
2. Do individuals who partially retire do so by reducing their
work effort in the jobs they held as prime age workers, or do they
partiallyretireoutside their "main jobs?"
3. Whatopportunities areavailableto older workers wanting to
retire partially intheirmainjobs?That is, what evidence is there
for institutional limitations which would prevent older workers from
partiallyretiring in their main jobs?1And ifsuch limitations are
found, how should theoretical andstructuraleconometric models of the
retirement process bemodifiedto account for them?
1For a discussion of cooperating factors andresultinglimitations
onthe worker's opportunities to determine the length of work day, see
Deardorff and Stafford (1980).2
4. How is partial retirement, both within andoutsidethe main
job,influenced by the standard set of policy related andotherex-
planatory variables normally included instudies of retirement behavior?
5. Is partial retirement both in andoutsidethe "mainjob"an
important option for those who arenotforced out of their main job by
illhealth, mandatory retirement,orenticedoutby attractive pension
benefits?
6. Is partial retirement important enough so thatestimated probe-
bi].itiesof retirement andthe estimated responsiveness of the retirement
probabilityto policy related and other explanatoryvariablesdepend
strongly onwhether partial retirement is incorporated in the analysis?
That is, is partial retirement important enough sothat if a study is
to analyze correctly the determinants of retirement,it must also consider
partial retirement?
The paper is divided into four main parts. Thefirst section examines
basic descriptive statistics drawn fromthe RetirementHistory Survey.
These statistics indicate the extent and natureof partial retirement
and provide answers to the first two questions posedabove. In addition,
they are used to examine thesensitivity of measurement to the definition
ofretirement adopted. Findings inthis section indicate that partial
retirementis a more important phenomenonthan is suggested by most
studies of retirement behavior. They also indicatethat partial retire-
ment, especially partial retirement inthe main job, would be an even
more important phenomenon in the absenceof institutional constraints
placinglower limits on time spent at work.
Section 2 sketches a numberofdifferent models of retirement
behavior. In this section, we illustratehow differences in the3
opportunities for work on a full—time or part-time basis in themainjob
andfor employmentoutside the main job affectthespecification of the
relevantstructural equations ina life cycle retirement model. Particular
attentionis paid to thepossibility that different people face different
constraintson their ability to reduce hours in their main job, andeven
toremainin their main jobat all past a certainage.
The next section presents empirical results for a basic retirement
equation in which there are four outccznes: full retirement, partial
retirement in the main job, partial retirement outside the main job and
nonretirement. The results frt this section are used to answer the
lastthree questions posed above. Findings aresuirunarized and conclusions
are presentedin the final section.
(.4
I. The Extent and Nature of Partial Retirement
This section contains descriptive statistics relevant to the
phenomenon of partial retirement. Most of thesedata are from the Retire-
ment History Survey, a longitudinal sample of individualswho were 58 to
63 years old when they were initially surveyed in 1969. Theyhave been
reinterviewed every two years. Responses from four survey years(1969,
1971, 1973, and 1975) are pooled. This procedure meansthat there is
a greater number of observations for those in themiddle ages of the
survey than for those in age brackets fallingin the extremes for the
group sample. Our analysis is restrictedto white males who are not
self-employed in their main job.1
It is useful to begin by considering how the frequency offull and
partial retirement is affected by the definition ofretirement used.
One obvious way to define retirement status is to use some objective
measure based on wages or hours. Another is to acceptthe individual's
self—description of retirement status. For each survey yearthe question—
aire asks whether the respondent considers himself to be completely
retired, partially retired, or not retired. In Table 1, werelate the
responses to this question to observableindications of work effort
reduction, either in the form of a reduction in hours perweek worked,
or in the form of a reduction in wages which maybe associated with an
inCl Cfl( ral ,Lite5;('if (lflJ)iOye(1 lidVe d h ijler p r. Oft] hi ii t:y
being partiallyretire than do those who are I1tjRii—emI)loyecI(çuinn
1980).Theywere dropped from this study because ofthedifficulty in
imputinga meaningful wage rate to such individuals.5
easier or more flexible job. The horizontal axis ofthis tablemeasures
theratio of the cuzrentwagethe individual is receiving to the wage
that the individual received in his main(lifetime)job.1 For this
purpose,the main job is taken to be the job that the individual held
at age 55 (as long as the individual worked at least 30 hours per week
in this job), or if wages andhoursinformation is unavailable for this
job, the longest job that the individual has held if information is
availablefor that job.2 Thevertical axis of this table similarly
measuresthe ratio of current weekly hours to weekly hours in the main
job.
The top partofthe table considers wage andhoursinformation for
peoplewho report that they arepartiallyretired. Most of the indi-
viduals whoindicate they are partially retired do in fact exhibit a
substantial reduction either in hours worked or in the wage rate they
arereceiving for working. For example, 68 percentof these people have
reducedeither their wages or their hours by over 40 percent from the
1
All nominal wages in this study have been deflated to 1967 using
the adjusted hourly earnings index. (Economic Report of the President,
Table B—35)
2
The wages and hours in the main job-aremeasuredas of the time the
individualterminated the job or, if he was still in it in 1969, as of
that year. This procedure was necessitated by the data. By defining
the main job as the full-time job held at age 55 we do not mean to imply
thatthere is no turnover in the main jobs. Data pertaining to such turn-
over are presented in Table 2 and are discussed below. We do, however,
take the job held at age 55 to be representative of the full-time oppor-
tunities available to the individual during primeworkingyears. In
requiring informationfor the main job, andin defining the main job as
we do, there will be a tendency to eliminate from the sample those in
occupations which are characterizedby very high turnover, eg., construction.6
Table 1
Wage and Hours Distributions by
ReportedRetirement Stntus
currentwage/main lob wage
0—20 20—40% 40—00%b0-00 80— 100? 1oO:
crrenhours! —
mainjob hours Self-reported as Partially Retired
(Percentage of 1417 observations)
0-20% .1% .3 1.2 .6 4.4
20—40 .7 2.6 4.9 3.5 2.5 6.7
40-60 1.1 4.0 5.1 3.1 2.5 4.7
60-80 .6 2.8 2.8 2.6-.
- —
4.4
80-100 .6 1.6 2.1 1.9 1.7 25
>100 3.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.0 12.5
Self—reported asNot red
(Percentage of 9691 observations)
0-20% 0% 0 0 0 0 .1
20—40 0 0 .1 0 0 .8
40-60 0 0 .1 .1 .2
60—80 0 .3 .3 .3 .6 3.2
80—100 .1 .5 .8 1.3 3.2 7.6
>100 .6 1.1 2.3 5.4 15.0 55.17
levels of wages and hours that they exhibited in their main jobs.
(Those exhibiting such a reduction fall in the cells above and to the
left of the dashed line in the table.) Prom the infonation in the table,
itappearsthat for those reporting partial retirement, a reduction in
wagesfrom the main job, suggesting an easier or more flexible job, is
slightly more coimnon than is a comparable percentagereduction in hours
worked. The statistics for individuals who report themselves as not
retired are presented inthe lower part of the table. Relatively few of
theseindividuals exhibited a substantial reduction in either wages or
hours from the levels found in the main job; only 8 percent had reductions
in either wages or hours that were as large as 40 percent.
Table 1indicates that some people consider themselves to be partially
retired even though they are working more, and forhigher wages, than
theydid in their main jobs, while others consider themselves not retired
even though they have experienced a substantial drop in hours or wages.
Nevertheless, there is a close correspondence between observed changes
in wages andhoursandreportedstatus. Indeed, although in ourempirical
analysis we classify people into different retirement categories based on
reported status, we obtain similar findings when we base the definition
of full-time work on an objective measure —i.e.,working at least 60%
of the hours for at least 60% of the wage paid in the main job.1
1Theadvantage ofmeasuring the dependent variable by self-reported
ratherthen objectively measured retirement status is that fewer obser-
vations need be eliminated from the sample using the formerdefinition.
An alternative definition, one which does not distinguish between retire-
ment and part—time work, classifies as partially retired all these who
workless than some numberof hours.(E.g., Zabaiza, Pissarides and
Barton, 1980).8
Table 2 reports on the percentages of individuals by age according
to their response as to whether they are retired, partiallyretired or
not retired, whether they are still in or have left the main job,and
whether or not the individual has faced or will face mandatoryretire-
ment in the main job. Note that the number of people intheir late 60's
who report they are partially retired is substantial. Indeed, amongthose
65 or over who are working the number who are partiallyretired is compa-
rable to the number who are working full-time. Around 20 percentof the
people in this age range who do not face mandatoryretirement on the main
job are partially retired at any point in time. Forthose who will or
have faced mandatory retirement on the main job and are65 or above, the
comparable figure is 11 percent.
e comparison of interest contrasts the informationin columns 1
and 2with thatin 3and4.This comparison suggests that while a person
whoisnot retired is much more likely to be working in the same job as
the one he held at age 55, a person who reports that he issemi—retired
is considerabley more likely to be in a different jobfrom the one held
at 55.
Table 2 also provides information on the relation betweenretire-
ment status andmandatoryretirement on the main job. Compared to indi-
viduals who do not face mandatoryretirement,those who are facing
mandatory retirement in the future have a higher probabilitythat they
willstill be working full-timein their main job andareduced proba-
bility thatthey will either have taken another full-time job orwill
have partially retired in any kind of a job. After the mandatoryretire-
ment age, a few people are able to remain in their main jobs,indicating
that for these individuals, either the mandatory retirement requirement9
Table2
Retirement Status, Job Changes, and
Mandatory Retirement
Not Retired Partially RetiredRetired
In MainNot inIn Main Not in
Age Job Main Job Job Main Job Observations
Among Those NotFacingMandatoryRetirement
58—61 61.1221.17 1.57 3.61 12.52 2796
62—64 33.53 18.60 3.01 10.82 34.04 3984
65—69 7.63 7.79 2.92 17.30 64.36 3866
AmongThose Facing MandatoryRetirement
in the Future
58—61 76.96 9.99 0.50 2.61 9.95 2222
62—64 48.8110.69 1.40 5.98 33.12 2778
65—59 11.12 6.55 1.66 9.54 71.14 1268
AmongThose Having Faced Mandatory Retirement
58—61 11.76 11.76 5.88 29.41 41.18 17
62—64 4.92 3.28 1.64 21.31 68.85 61
65—69 1.16 2.42 0.45 11.10 84.87 1117
*
Notethat for an observation to be included in this table, it was
necessary that we could determine whether or notthereis mandatory
retirementin the individual's main job. The probabilities of
partial retirement for those includedin this table aresomewhat below
theprobabilities for the entire sample. For example, the probability
in the entire sample of a white male who is 65 or above reporting he
is partially retired is about 19% compared to a weighted average of
17% for the same age group in the above table.10
must have been waived, or that the initial response wasincorrect.
Nevertheless, most people who were subject to mandatoryretirement
andhave passed the mandatory retirement age do indeed leavetheir main
jobs, andare correspondinglymore likely to be retiredcctnpletely)
while a substantial fraction of individuals face mandatoryretirement
intheir main job, and must either find another job or retire after
mandatory retirement age is reached, of more interest to usis the finding
that a large group of people is induced to leave their main job even
thoughthey arenotsubject to mandatory retirement provisions, presumably
because they find analternativejob that is more attractive in sane way,
suchas offering easier work or more flexible hours.
Although Table 2 indicates that a significant number of peopleof
different ages are partially retired, it does not tell us how likely
any particular individual is to become partiallyretired at sane point
in his life. In the extreme, these figures might reflect either a
1
It should be recognized that franthistable alone, we cannot be
surethat the differences in retirement probabilities seeminglyassociated
with mandatory retirement arenot,at least partially, the result of a
correlation between mandatory retirement andsomeexcluded factor (eg.,
theavailability of a pension, or perhaps more troubling,the opportunity
for an older individual to retire partially on themain job). The retire-
ment equations we estimate below will attempt to standardizefor sane,
but not all, of theseother influences. In particular,the Retire-
ment History Survey provides no objective information onwhich main jobs
offer the opportunity for partial retirement and whichdo not. Figures
whichdo provide sane information on the opportunities for partialretire-
ment are discussed below.11
situation in which one in five or sixindividualspartially retires and
remains in that state for a number of years, or it might reflect a
situation in which a large number of individuals partially retires but
remainsin that state for a relatively shortduration. Table 3, which
reports onthe relation between the fractionof individuals who were
partiallyretired during atleast one of the four survey years of the
Retirement History Surveyaccordingto age in the last survey year, 1975,
suggests thatthe actual situation falls between these extremes, with
at least one-third of such individuals becoming partially retired at
sometime during their lifetime.1
Twoimplicationsof the data in Tables 2 and3should be emphasized.
First,since they indicate that partial retirement is an important
phenomenon, they imply that if a dichotomous measure ofretirement status
is used, as it is in many studies, (eg., Clark and Johnson, 1980, and
Quinn, 1977) findings may differ in a non-trivial way depending on
whether the partially retired are classified with the retired or with
those still working. Second, it also means that a model of retirement
behavior which excludes the possibility of partial retirement is mis-
specified with respect to an important aspect of behavior, andraises
the possibility that any resulting specification errors may be large.
Thus the descriptive statistics raise the possibility that inappropriate
treatment of partial retirement in analyses of retirement behavior may
haveimportant consequences. These 'implications underline the importance
S
1Thetable is confined to individuals for whom retirement status
is self reported for all four waves of the survey.ha
Table 3
Percentage and Number of individuals Indicating
They Were Partially Retired



















all four waves of the
o those who responded to
S urvey.12
of the last of the questions posed in the introduction.
The data in Table 4 indicate the percentages, by occupation and
industry,of those in oursamplewho report that they are semiretired.
Axxng occupations, professionals, managers, craftsmen andoperatives
are least likely, andfarmerssales workers, private household workers
andserviceworkers are most likely to report they are semiretired.
There are analogous differences anng industries. Individuals in
manufacturing, transportation, communication and public utilities, and
public administration are least likely to report they are semiretired,
while individualsin agriculture, forestry, fisheries, finance,
insurance and real estate, personal services, wholesale and retail
andconstructionare most likely to report they are semiretired. These
distributions areinaccord with general notions about which occupations
andindustriesprovide opportunities for part-time work.1
Ourprimarydata source, the Retirement History Survey, does not
contain anydirect evidenceas to whether these differences in the
proportion of semiretired workers reflect differences in the opportunities
for a worker to phase into retirement by reducing hours of work on the
main job. A question was asked on the University of Michigan Survey
Research Center's Panel Study of Income Dynamics which does provide
1There is some direct information on flexible retirement
arrangements. Consistent with the figures presented in Table 3,
according to a 1979 survey by the Bureau of National Affairs, only
10% of responding manufacturing companies offered tapered retirement
programswherehourscouldbe gradually reduced as the individual
phasedinto retirement, and just 3%of manufacturing companies made
such programs available to all employees.On the otherhand, 27
percent of what they call non-business concerns (universities, hospitals,
etc.) had such programs, with all employees eligible in 19% of the
responding non—business concerns. For related dataonindustries and
occupationswhich provide opportunities for part-time work, see































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































strong evidence that on many jobs, workers are not free to workless.
Using yearly observations from 1971 to 1975 for 25 to 54 year old males,
56% of those for whom one can determine whether they are at alower limit
to time worked on their job indicate thattheycouldnot work less even
ifthey wanted to. For full time workers who arebetween55 and65years
of age, the comparablefigureis 60 percent.
These findings are contrary to the assumption used in many studies
(for instance, Gordon and Blinder) that workers are free to vary their
hours continuously between zero and full—time work. And, because the
requiredinformation isnot reported on the PSIthesefigures do not take into
accountthat some individuals, although technically free to reduce hours
on theirmain job, would face severepenalties in doing so because their
pensionsaredeterminedby a formula based on final average salary.
In sum, we find that partial retirement is a relatively con
phenomenon among older workers. The partial retirement occurs primarily
in jobs other than the individual's main lifetimejob, despite the fact
thatan individual's wage rate is likely to be higher in the main job
1
Theskip pattern in that question is such that some people are
not asked whether they could reduce time at work if they wished to.
Specifically, if the person indicated that there was no more work
available on the job, and that he would like to work more hours,
he was never asked if he could work less if he wanted to. This
problem affected approximately 27% of the sample.14
than inother jobs. The descriptive statistics suggest thatinstitutional
limitations-—directlyonhoursor indirectly through pension and mandatory
retirement regulations-—prevent a number of people from reducinghours
worked on their main jobs. Indeed, without these limitations,partial
retirement might well be even more prevalent than it actuallyis.
II. Variations on the Life Cycle Model of Retirement
Behavior arid Implications for Estimation
In this section we explore models of retirement behaviorand
modifications required by various limitations on the opportunitiesfor
partial retirement. First, we briefly describe thestandard life cycle
model of retirement behavior. We then discuss how differencesin
opportunities for partial retirement are reflected inthe specification
of the utility function and the opportunity set facingeach individual,
and how this influences the retirement decision that emergesfrom the
standard life cycle model.
Thebasic retirement decision may be viewed as the solutionto a
lifetime utility maximizationproblem. In the simplest fori ofthis
problem,theindividual is assumed to live for T years, andat each
point in time he may choose both his level of consumptiOnand his work
effort. The total utility that the individual achievesfrom his de-
cisionsisgiven by:
U=u[C(t),H(t), t; a]dt (1)
where C(t) is consumption at time t, H(t) is labor supplyat time t,15
and a is avector of parameters which influence the shape of the indi-
vidual'sutility function. Theutilityfunction is assumed to be
separableover time, andlabor supply is measured in units suh that H (t)
must lie between 0 and 1.The individual maximizes this utility
functionsubject to the budget constraint:
!e_rtC(t)dt =+ feH(t)w(t)dt (2)
where r is the real interest rate, K0 is initial wealth, and W(t) is
the wage offer at time t.
This problem is of the form that may be analyzed with the theory
of optimal control.1 With some minor assumptions about the boundedness
andcontinuityof the function u, optimal control theory assures that
a solution to the problem does exist. That is, there is a consumption
pathC*(t) and a labor supply path H*(t) which satisfy the budget con-
straint and which yield a higher total utility than any other pair of
pathswhich also satisfy the constraint.The optimalpathswill in
generalvary withthe parameters a in the utility function and withthe
wagepath w, so thatthe optimal paths should more completely bewritten
as C*(t; a, W) and H*(t, a, W).
Consider now the effect of introducing alternative job environ-
ments, i.e., altering the opportunity set facing the worker. The job
For studies which utilize controltheory in analyzing theretire-
ment problem,see Reimers (1977), Samnartino (1978), and Clark and
Johnson(1980).16
environment contemplated in the basic model is one in which the indi-
vidual is free to varyhis hoursonthe jobwithout affecting the wage
rate which is available to him.A secondjob environment analyzed in the
literature requires that the labor supply decision be an all-or- nothing
one, sothat the person must either work full-time or retire (Burbidte
and Robb,1980). Thisis imposed on the model by requiring thatH(t)
takeononly the extreme values 0 and1.1 Athird environment would be
onein which theworkeris subject tomandatory retirement provisions
in his main job at age R, after which he must work in another job,
possibly at substantially reduced wages, if he desires to continue to
work.2 Analytically, this environment differs from the first only in
that it specifies that there is likely to be a sharp drop in the wages
available to the worker after age R. Before mandatory retirement H(t)
refers to hours supplied to the main job, and after mandatoryretirement
it refers to hourssuppliedto the alternative job.
Two further environments assume that there are alwaystwo jobs
available to the individual, and that some aspect ofthe main job becomes
moreonerous over time, ultimately causing theindividual to choose an
alternate"semiretirement" job or to retire completely. Theseenviron-
1Therestriction that H(t) canbe only 0 or 1 introduces a compli-
cation into the optimal control problem, namely, that thecontrol set
is ne longer convex [e.g., 0.5 is a linear combination of 0arid 1 but
is not itself a permissible value for H(t)], as required bythe optimal
control theory. This kind of complication, which is also found in many
ofthe other extensions examined inthissection, can beovercome by
atechnique described inGustmanandSteinmeier(1981). Theimportant
point for purposes of the present discussion is that evenwith this
complication, the control problem still possesses a determinatesolution
forthe optimal paths of consumption andlabor supply.
BoskinaridHurd(1978)and GordonandBlinder(1980)consider
mandatory retirement, but only in a context where hoursworked are fully
variable at the wage offered onthemain job.17
mentsrecuire that both the utility function and the budget constraint
bemodified to allow for bothjobs. The utility function would become
U=i u[C(t),H1(t), H2(t), t; a]dt (3)
where the subscripts indicate the labor supply to the twojobs.Normally,
notboth H1 (t) and H2 (t) can be positive—that is, the individual may





where (t) and (t) are the wages in the two jobs. In one of these
environments,the main jobbecomes increasingly difficult to perform
asthe individual becomes older (e.g., the job may involve hard physical
labor).This is reflected in the fact the H1(t) reduces the value
of the utility function more than would a similar nber of hours
H2
(t)
inthe transition job. (For a related analysis,see Quinn, 1977.) The
otherenvironment limits work in the main jobto be either full-time or
notat all, whilepart-time work is permitted in the transition job.
This may be introduced in the modelby constraining H1(t), but not H2(t),
to be either 0 or 1.
For each of the five job environments described above, the optimal
controlproblem will have as a solution a determinate pair of pathsfor
consumptionand laborsupply.However, these paths will in general not
be identical. This means that the paths of consumptionand labor supplyare dependent not just on the parameters a which influencethe shape of
theutilityfunction and the waqes offered to theindividual,but[hey
alsodependon the type of job environment within which the individual
muet make his decisions This may be explicitly indicated by writ.inq
the optimal paths more completely as C (t a, W, c) and11*(t; a, W,
e), where e is an index of the type ofjobenvironment relevant to the
particular individual.
Socialsecurity and/or private pensions may also beintroduced into
tile models.TheSocial Security system has two effects on the model.
One isto reduce the net wage in any period by the amount of theSocial
Securitytax:
W (t) =(1—s)W(t) n
where W(t) is the after-tax wage and s is the Social Security tax rate.
The second effect is to introduce additional payments to the individual
which are determined fr a caitplicated relationship involving past
wages,past employment choices, andseveral Social Security parameters.
Thesebenefits are given by the expression b(W, H, t;S) where W and H
are the time paths of wages and hours, respectively1 and Sis a vector
of Social Security parameters. w(t) and b are introduced intomodel
of retirement behavior through the budget constraint.
Private pensions may be introduced into the models in much the
same way as Social Security. Instead of the Social Securitytax rate
s there is the pension contribution rate p, and the private pension
benefit formula f(W, H, t, P) replaces the Social Security benefit19
formulab. P is a vector of parameters which determine the shape of the
benefit function. ForbothSocial Security and private pensions, changes
in the contribution rate and the benefit formula, by changing theshape
of the lifetime budget constraint facing the individual,may be expected
to affect optima]. consumption and labor supply paths over time. Thus,
C*(t)andH*(t), in addition to being functions of a, W, and e, may also
beconsidered as functions of the contribution rates s andp and the
vectors S andPwhich determine the nature of the benefit formula.
Implications for Estimation.
The optima]. path of labor supply H*(t) provides a basis for the
retirement equations estimated in the next section. The path isa
function of wages, the individual characteristics which causeutility
functions to vary from person to person, the specific job environment
facing the individual, and the contribution rates and benefit formulae
for Social Security andpensionplans. By defining complete retire-
ment, partialretirement, and full-time work in terms of the labor supply
pathH* (t), the retirement status of an individual can be madea function
ofthese same variables.1 In a model with a single job, for instance,
partial retirement might be defined as the reduction of labor supply
below full-time work, and complete retirement might be definedas the
cessation of labor supply. In terms of H*(t), partial retirement would
occurif O<H*(t)<1, andcompleteretirement would occur whenH*(t) =0.
1The arguments ofthe reduced form relations would not bealtered
even if one were to modify the life cycly modelto meet objections as to its utility in explaining
savings and consumption behavior such as those raised by Kurz (1981).20
In a model with two jobs, partial retirement mightbe alternatively defined
tooccur when the individual leaves the main jobandentersthe transition
job.It should be clear thatthesedefinitions containadegree of
arbitrariness, a problem which is compounded if onlytwo retirementstates
—working andretired—areconsidered. In this latter case, it may
makea great deal of difference to the estimateswhether someone who is
still working butatconsiderably reduced hours is considered tobe
retired or working.
Theretirement status, however defined, can thusbe estimated as
afunction of age and of the variables which cause budgetconstraints
and utilityfunctionsto vary among individuals. The problem, of course,
is that without a specific derivation of theretirement equation from
the structural model (which is usually impossiblewithout severely
simplifyingassumptions or questionable approximations)t wehave little
ideaabout the form that this function might take.After all, the
function is being implicitlydefined as the solution to a control
problem, andonemight suspect that the resulting formwould be rather
complicated.For this reason, it wouldbevery dubious to tryto
estimate the retirement equation with a methodwhich assumes a linear
or some other rigid functional form. Rather,methods which can deal
with flexible functional forms and let the datatell us about the shape
of the function are required in this problem.One relatively easy-t0
use technique that satisfies this requirementis the discrete multi
variateanalysis algorithm described in Bishop, Feinberg,andHolland
(1975). Another technique which probably doesalmost as well in most
cases is OLSwithdummyexplanatoryvariables and with a liberal search21
for interaction terms among the duitny variables. Both of thesemethods
use a potentially very large number of parameters to fitany function
reasonably well.
III. Estimates and Implications of the Retirement
Equation
Thissection addresses the last three questions raised in the intro-
duction. The basic empirical modelestimatedhere is a retirement
equationofthe kind developedinthe last section. In this model, the
dependentvariable is theprobability that an individual will fall in a
givenretirement category (completely retired, partially retired in the
main job, partially retired outside the main job or not retired) The
explanatory variables are as follows:2
1lndicatorsof retirement used in other studies include pension
acceptance (Boskin and Hurd,1978),hours per week of work (Zabaiza,
Pissarides and Barton, 1980) and a measure of labor market flow out of
one job, and conditionally into another (Burkhauser and Quinn, 1980).
Both hours of work per week and rates of flow from one job into others
are imperfect indicators of retirement status. someindividuals
partiallyretire by cutting weeks, not hours, or by obtaining easier
jobs.These individuals arenot counted as partially retired when an
hoi.irsper week criterion is used. In thecaseof the flow criterion,
notethat the flow out of a particular job includes individuals who
are leaving one main job for another, others who are leaving one partial
retirement job for another, and still others who are moving from either
a partial, retirement job or a main job into retirement. However, this
flow excludes those partially retiring within the main job.
Two of the studies noted above utilize a dependent variable that
consists of the probability of falling in one of three states—full
retirement, partial retirementand non-retirement.(Boskin andHurd and
Zabalza, Pissarjdes and Barton.)However, both studies are based on
modelswhich incorporate a utility function specified not over the
lifetime, but for a single period.
2We recognize that anumber of these variables may be endogenous
to the analysis. These include the two wages, pension or social security
coverage, mandatoryretirementprovision on the job, and health status.
Acomplete life cycle model mightexplaineach ofthese in termsof the
fullopportunity set available to the individual and expected productivity
over the life cycle, but that is beyond the scope of this paper.22
1.A nasu.re of age consisting of eight categories(58-59, 60—61, 62,
63, 64, 65, 66—67, 68—69)
2.A measure of the usual hourly wage (in1967 dollars) in a non-
retirement job, adjusted to age 63 in accordancewith the age—wage
profile estin'iated from a wage equation.There are four categories
(<$2.00, $2.00—3.00, $3.00—4.25, and >$4.25/hr.)
3.A measure of the wage in a partial retirementjob, adjusted to the
66—67 age range with an age-wage profileestimated for partial
retirement jobs. There are four categories(<$1.25, $1.251.75,
$l.75—2.60, and >$2.60/hr).
4.A measure of pension coverage in the main job,with three categories
(no coverage, private sector pension coverage,andpublicsector
pension coverage).
5.An indicator of Social Security coverage,with three categories
(covered, not covered, and uncertain coveragedue to missing
information).
6.A measure of mandatory retirement provisionsin the main job, with
four categories (currently below the mandatoryretirement age,
currently above the mandatory retirement age,not subject to
mandatoryretirementprovisions1 anduncertainabout mandatory
retirement provisions duetolack of information).
7.A dichotomous measure differentiatingbetween those who report they
are healthy and those who do not.
8.A measure of marital status with threecategories (never married,
married with spouse present, and other)23
9. A dichotomous indicator of whether the individual is supporting
his or his spouse's parents.
10. Adichotomous variable indicating whether or not there arechildren
under18 in the home.
Three other variables which the analysis of the last section suggested
shouldbeincluded in the equation had to be omitted due to a lack of
adequate date in the Retirement HistorySurvey.These arean indicator
ofwhether or not he individual was in a job environment which permitted
a gradual reduction in work effort, a set of parameters describing the
various pension plans, and an indication of the difficulty of work in
the mainjob)To the extent that these variables enter the retirement
decision, andtothe extent that they arecorrelatedwith other variables
which areincluded in the equation, the omission of these variables will
leadto standard omitted variables bias.
1
Unfortunatelythe PSID, which doescontain information on the ability ofworkers to reduce hours, is inadequate in other ways, e.g., there are' few
older workers and no information on mandatory retirement. It is possible
using the data in the Retirement History Survey to impute, in a crude way,
the value of pensions. But no information is available in the Retirement
History Survey on thecrucially important effect of additional earnings on
the marginal value ofpensionwealth, oron whether part—time work on the
mainjob will affect adversely the level of earnings used to calculate
pension benefits. For a discussion of the relation between the marginal
val of the life—time pension stream and the increment in lifetime income
associated with additional work, see Fields and Mitchell, 1981.24
withregard to social security, a largenumber of parameters (the
contribution rate s and the vector S whichdetermines the nature of the
benefitformula)from the modelof retirement behavior discussed in
Section II have been reduced to a simpledichotomOUsvariable. This
was done becausethe break points andthemarginal taxratesbetween
thosepoints in the Social Security systemdo not vary across indi-
viduals once the wage offer curve, age, andmaritalstatusare stand-
ardized for.1
Sincethesingle wage job environments describedin the previous
sectioncanbesubsumed under two—wage environments, separate wagesfor
non—retirement and partialretirement jobs were included in the retire-
ment equationfor everyone. Where values of these wageswere not
directly observed, values were imputed separatelyfor the wages in non—
retirementandpartial retirement jobs using wage equationsestimated
from those who did have observations onthe type of wage in question.
+
Thevariables in the wage equations includededucation, health, age,
residencein an SMSA,and additionallyfor the non-retirement wage
equation, occupation, pension eligibility,
and the tenure that would
haveaccrued to the individual had he remainedin his main job.
11t would beinappropriateto include as an exogenous explanatory
variable in a retirement equation the currentvalue of social security
wealth.This measure is endogenous to anylife-cycle labor supply
decision. At best, one could include ameasurf full social security
wealth(i.e., a measure of social securitywealth which is independent
of work effort), but since full social securitywealth is largely
determinedbyvariableS.alreaY
included in the model (wage in the main
job,marital status, andsocialsecurity eligibility), the inclusion
of this variable would result in anunidentified or veryweakly
identified model.'25
Al]. wagesareadjust:orlto a standardized ageisi ng the aqe—wiqe
profile from the estimated wage equation. We areassuming for purposes
of our ompi r i eann 1ynithat: waqorrfin 1nw'tin inc101 e. The o--
fore,the standardized wagemeasurctN heiqht: of the prof I.Usn
ofthis standardized wage variable is therefore cons intent withthe
theory developed above, in which labor supply atany moment influenced
by the course of events over the entire life cycle.
It was recognized that the imputation proceduremight be subject
to selectivity bias, and a test for selectivity biaswas carried out.
Essentially, we estimated a reduced form equation explaining theprobability
of full or part—time work and included acateqorica3 variable based on
this probability in the wage equations. The test did indicate that:self—
selection was present in the wage equations, hut: correctionsfor this
problem had Only a very minor effect on the estimated parameters of the
retirement equation —usuallychanging parameter estimates by only
a few tenths of a percentage point. Accordi.nqly, the reported results
do not standardize for the effects of selectivity bias.1Additional
details of the procedure to correct for selectivity biasare found in
Gustman arid Steinmeier (1981).
The empirical estimates are based on discrete rnultivarjateanalysis,
a technique which Haberman (1978) has shown to he exactlyequivalent to
multinomial logit when the explanatory variables arecategorical, and
1
These results are available on request..26
whenequivalent sets of interactions are included. Unlike multinomial
logit, however, discrete multivari.ate analysis jermitsa relatively
easy search for complex interactions, which are expectedboth because
the retirement equation is the solution to a complicated life cycle
laborsupply problem, and because previous wurk on retirement behavior
leads us to expect complex interactions amonq such explanatory variables
as health status, mandatory retirement provisions, pensions, and Social
Securitycoverage, and wage offers. The test for the siqnificanceof
particular interactions is a likelihood ratio test utilizing a test
7 2
statistic(AG )whichhas a xdistributioniind'r the nul]. hypothesis
that the interaction in question has no effc ritb dependcnLvariable.
1
Effect of the Explanatory Variables on Partii1 :ct irment
The estimation produces a set of parameters which, bythemselves,
aretedious to interpret. Results are muchmore eailyunderstO0d!f they
arepresentedin terms of how the sample would respond to changesin
the various explanatory variables. Table 5indicatesthe sample-
weighted average impact of each of the explanatoryvariables on the
four retirement status probabilities. The entriesin the table are
calculated by first finding the estimated impact ofthe variable in
questionoil the computed probabilities for eachindividual in the
sample, holding all other explanatory variablesat the values actually
observed for that individual, and then by avera'inqthe responses across
'Sinnediscrete multivartate modeL; 1L('"I ret':hi,i1,"i 5iqnificant
higher order term requiresthat all implied lower order interactionsalso
be included.27
theindividuals in the sample.Forexanipin I i(;ure5 tnI:hc column
entitled"PrivatePension" are the calculated probabilities for a sample
which was like the actual sample in all respects except that everyone
had a private pension, less the probabilities calculated for a similar
sample in which no one had a private pension.
Column 1 of the table reports theeffeeLof variation in t1' wmjn
offeron the main job between the highest and lowest categories. It
can be seen that the major effect of a high wage offer in a nonretirernent
job is to reduce the probability of partial]v retiring outside the main
job and toincrease theprobabilityof not retiring at all. Thechange
(des]me) inthe prohabi] .Ly of partially rctirnq ntside the rndn job
is particularly large when compared to the percentage of respondents
who actually do partially retire, as shown in Table 2. The effects of
variations in the wage in the partial retirement: job, as reported in
column 2, are numerically ouch weaker.
2Tho ncn—respons3veiio;n of partial. r(Liycnhr iin t-hemain iob to
full-timewages may be attributed to the fact that, for those who have
the optionofpartially retiring in the main oh, ldqh full—time wages
and high partialreLirement wagesgotogether.Table 5

































































































































































































































CoLumn3:Pr(Ret.Status/Private Pension) —Pr(Ret. Status/NoPension)













Status/Above Mandatory Retirement Age)
Status/Not Subject to Mandatory Retirement)
Status/Below Mandatory Retirement Age)
Status/Not Subject to Mandatory Retirement)29
Table5 (continued)
Estimated Impact of Explanatory Variables on Retirement Status
Retirement Explanatory Van ables"
Status
and SocialHealth NeverWidowed, ChildrenSupporting






















































































































































































































































in this table are calculated as:
Pr (Pet. Status/Eligible for Social Security)
-Pr (Ret. Status/Not E].egible for Social Security)
Pr (Pet. Status/Healthy) -Pr(Ret. Status/Not Healthy)
Pr (Ret. Status/Never Married)
-Pr (Ret. Status/Married, Spouse Present)
Pr (Ret. Status/Widowed, Separated, or Divorced)
—Pr (Ret. Status/Married, Spouse Present)
Pr (Ret. Status/Children at Home)
—Pr (Ret. Status/No Children at Home)
Pr (Pet. Status/Supporting Parents)
-Pr (Pat. Status/Not Supporting Parents)30
Table 5 (continued)
-"The following groups of variables interacted significantly in their
effect on retirement status:
degrees
2 of
Group of variables G freedom prob-value
1. wage in partial—retirement job 25.1 9 99.7%
2.social security, pension 79.8 18 100.0
3. social security, mandatory retirement status 46.2 18 99.9
4. social security, age 234.4 42 100.0
5. children at home,pension 20.9 9 98.7
6. supporting parents, mandatory retirement status18.2 9 96.8
7. marital status, pension 51.9 18 100.0
8. pension, manôatory retirement status 91.0 27 100.0
9. pension, wage in non—retirement job 122.4 27 100.0
10. mandatory retirement status, age 113.4 63 99.9
11. health, pension, age 100.0 63 99.7
The reader is reminded that since discretemultivariate models are
"hierarchical ,"theinclusion of all higher order terms implies that
lowerorder terms involving subsets of the same variables arealso
included.31
Resultspresented in the next two columns indicate the relation
betweenpension coverage and retirementoutcomes. A person with a
privatepensionexhibitsa lower probability of either working full-
time or retiring partially in the main job than does someone without
a pension. Since normally one must leave the job to collect a pension,
pension formulas which are actuarially unfair (i.e., with an expected
value that declines with each additional year of work) would reduce the
probability of work on the main job. In addition, since for individuals
interest rates paid on borrowed funds exceed rates received on loans, liquidity
effects of pension eligibility may encourage retirement. Finally, as
noted previously, partial retirement on the main job will be discouraged if
earningsina year in whichtheindividual works part-time ,ould be
counted in determining the pension benefit. The effect of public sector
pensionsissimilar to that of private pensions.
Columns5and6 consider the effects of mandatory retirement. The
consequences of having already faced mandatory retirement on the prob-
abilityof not retiring are enormous. Having already faced mandatory
retirement makesit muchlesslikely that an individual will be found
in full—time work. This effect declines with age. The reason for this
decline is that the probability of not retiring falls with age even for
those who do not face mandatory retirement, so that the older the worker,
the smaller is the difference in this probability associated with mandatory
retirement. As would be expected, the probability of partially retiring
in the main job is also lower for those who have already faced mandatory32
retirementSome of tho ;e who have been for cod out of thei rma injb
retirefully,while others are seen to take part-time jobs outside of
themain job.Those who will face mandatory retirement in the future
arc less likely to retire partially in theirmain job than are those
with no mandatory retirement, less likely to retire partiallyoutside
of their main job (but this effect is smaller), and byand large are
more likely to keep working full-time in thatmain job.
For the Social Security variable, the re;nl.ts mdirate that people
coveredby ccciii securityOr(J(nernilyen ih.lyH) H H t:Hr itired
orto be working full—time, and are more likely to be partiallyretired,
especially outside of the main job, thanarc thonewhoare not covered.
Remaining findings indicate that healthproblems].ncreascthe probability
offull retirement and reduce the probability of fuiJ—time work,that those
with the responsibilities of supporting parents (or chi idren) are more
likely to be working full—time, and those without a spouseare more likely
to report they have retired.
partial Retirement Timoncj Those Not Subject to MandatoryRetirement
In Table 6, we examine the behavior of an individualwith a
particularlyinteresting set of characterisitCs. The individualdescribed
in this table has no pension, no mandatory retirement provisionson the
main job, and no health problems. In addition, heis eligible for
The sign and especially the magnitude ofthe effect on the proba-
bility of partially retiring for 58-59 yearolds of having already faced
mandatory retirement reflects what is likelyto be an aberrant relation-
ship for a very small sample of individuals inthis category.33
SocialSecurity benefits, has no children at home, is not supportingparents,
ismarried with spouse present, andhas a wage offer in the third category
forboth jobs.
Thisindividual is interesting because he is typical of the indi-
viduals analyzed in many retirementmodels. He is neither forced out
ofthe main job by mandatory retirement or healthnor is he enticed out
by high marginal disincentives which are found inmany pension plans.1
Comparing Table 6 with the top part of Table2,we find that this mdi-
vidua]. has about the same total probability ofpartial retirement as the
averagefor everyone not subject to mandatory retirement(regardless of
pension status, health, etc), but the partial retiree is somewhatmore
likely than average to be in the main job. Moreover, this individual
is more likely than average to be working full-time, andcorrespondingly
lesslikely to befully retired. An important result from Table 6 is
thateven amongpeoplenot subject to mandatory retirement, a significant
numberpartially retire outside the main job. The data from the PSID,
cited earlier, suggest that a plausible reason for this isthat many
people cannot reduce their workload in the main job and hencemay find
the reduced workload in an alternative job attractiveeven if it involves
a lower wage rate. Together, these results lead us toquestion utility
function parameter estimates, such as those obtainedby Gordon andBlinder,
1Thereremains the póssiblity of an involuntary separationthrough alayoff. The datadonot permitusto determine the reason for
separationfrom a job.Note, however, that forsome older workers a
layoffmay have anambiguous meaning. Thatis, an employer with a UI tax
rate that is not very sensitive to changes in theunemployment experience of its :work force because the rate is at aceiling or floor may agree
to layoff some older workers before they retire to allowthem to collect
UI benefits. The period covered by the data predateschanges in UI
regulations which were designed to deal with this problem.34
Table 6
Estimated Probabilites For An Individual
in Good Health, without a Pension, and
Not Facing Mandatory Petirementa
Retirement Status
Partiallypartially Re-
Not Retired intired Outside
Age Retired Main Job of Main Job Retired
58—59 .988 .003 .001 .008
60—61 .970 .012 .011 .007
62 .865 .047 .036 .052
63 -.827 .035 .054 .085
64 .616 .048 .088 .249
65 .396 .099 .089 .417
66—67 .218 .075 .129 .578
68—69 .099 .064 .117 .720
1Other characteristics for this individual are enumerated in the
text.35
basedon models which predict thatall partialretirement should occur
in the inai.n job unless mandatory retirement or involuntary separation
intervene.
Dichotomous Dependent Variables
To answerthe last of the questions we posed above, we turn now to
the implications of our findings for retirement studies which utilize a
dependent variable which is dichotomous —retiredor not retired. A
problem arises for such studies because there are only two retirement
categories, with no clear cut criteria for deciding whether the partially
retired should be classified as retired or not. The obvious question is
thether findings areaffectedby the choice ofwhichcategory the partially
retiredare placed in. This question can be answered by comparing the
changes in the probabilities reported in the bottom panel of Table 5
with the negative of those in the top panel. The bottompanelindicates
theresponsiveness of the probability of beingretiredto variation in
the independent variables, where the partially retired are not counted
in the retired group. The top panel indicates the reponsiveness of the
probability of full—time work to variation inthe iiidependent variables, and
hence the negative of these figures indicates the responsiveness of the
probability of retirement to variation in independent variables, where
in this case the partially retired are counted as retired.
Itis readily apparent from these figures that the choice of
definition,i.e. whether the partially retiredare classified as retired
ornot retired, may have a substantial impact on the measured effects
of the explanatory variables on retirement probabilities. For example,
a higher wage in the non-retirement job reduces the probability of36
retirementwhen the partially retired are countedas retired, but when
they are not counted,depending on age,
it either has little effect on ar increases
theprobability of full retirement. Asimilar effectcanbe observed for mend—
atoryretirement (coltmn 6). Other sucheffects can also be seen..ThesereSults
demonstrate that the discrepenCy in findingsbetween retirement equations
using different definitions for adichotomous retirement variable,which
inturn dependsonthesize anddirectionof the effects of variation in
theindependent variable on the probabilitiesof partial and complete
retirement, can, in some cases, be quite large.Thus we find that the
treatment of partial retirement may importantlyinfluence the findings
of studies using a dichotomous retirementvariable.
InteractionEffects
A ni.mtherofinteraction effects, which arereportedin the foot-
notes to Table 5, are statistically significent.
This means that the
average responses reported inthat table are not necessarily the responses
wewould expect from each individual inthe sample. While we do not
report in detail the effects ofthese interactions, some major effects
should be mentioned.
1. There is a significant interactionbetween the pension variable
and the wage offer in the main job. Amongthose with no pension, a
higher wage in the main job reducesslightly both the probability of
complete retirement and the probabilityof partially retiring outside
the main job. Among those with a pension, ahigher wage in the main job
increases by as much as twenty percentagepoints the probability of
complete retirement, and it reducesthe probability of partially retiring
outside the main job substantially morethan for those with no pension.37
the other side of this interaction, low wage workers who are
covered by a pension are more likely to retire partially outside of the
main job than are those who are not covered. Amonghighwage workers,
those covered by a pension are less likely to retire partially outside
of their main job than are those with no pension. Instead, among high
wage workers those with a pension are even more likely to retire fully.
2. Health status and private pension coverage exhibit a significant
interaction effect. Poor health reduces the probability of working full
time more for those with no pension than for those with a pension. Among
those who are healthy, pension coverage reduces the probability of working
full-time more than for those who are unhealthy.
3.Pension coverage andmandatoryretirement provisions exhibit
a significant interaction effect. For example, amongthosewho do not
have a pension, individuals who will face mandatory retirement are
morelikely to keep working full-time than are thosewho will not face
mandatoryretirement. Among those who have a pension,individuals who
willface mandatory retirement are less likely to keep working full—time
than are those who do not face mandatory retirement .Also,individuals
are less likely to keep working full—time if they are covered by a
pension than if they are not, and the negative effect of pension coverage
is even stronger among those who will face mandatory retirement on their
main job than it is among those who will not.
IV Conclusion
This paper has considered the role of partial retirement in the
analysisof retirement behavior. It has been structuredto provide38
answers to six questions posed at theoutset. These answers are
summarized in the following conclusions:(1) Descriptive statistics
pertainingto partial retirement demonstrate that partialretirement is
indeed an important phenomenon.(2) Some individuals partially retire
in their main job but a relatively larger numberpartiallyretire outside
oftheir main job.(3) Individuals face a number of different opportunity
sets. Most are not free to reduce hours in theirmain jobs. Differing
opportunities for work on a full-time or part-timebasis in the main job
and for employment outside of the main job maybe included in the
specification of the relevant structural equationsof a life cycle retire-
ment model by appropriate modifications of thelifetime budget constraint
and/or modifications of the form of the utilityfunction.(4) The
probability of partial retirement, especiallyof partial retirement
outside of the main job, is related significantly toindicators of
coverage from pension programs, mandatoryretirement provisions, wage
offers in main and partial retirement jobs, health, familystatus, and
of course age.(5) For those who are not forced out of theirmain job
by poor health or by mandatory retirement provisions,or who are not
attracted out by pension provisions, partial retirementboth within and
outside the main job is an important phenomenon.The numerical importance
of partial retirement outside of the main jobfor this group calls into
question results based on models whichmake no allowance for this phenomenon.
(6)parameter estimates in studies of retirementbehavior which use a
dichotomous dependent variable are sensitiveto the way the partially
retired are classified —asretired or not retired.
A nextimportantstepto betakenifwe are to understand retire—39
ment behavior is to follow on the path-breaking work of Gordon andBlinder.
Although these authors considered only a limited numberofjob environments,
their work specifying andestimatinga basic structural model of retire-
ment, includingmost importantly the parameters of the utility function,
was an important step forward. In the absence of good structural estimates,
we cannot determine the effects of the major changes in retirement policy
which have recently been proposed, such as changes in theages of normal
and early retirement under social security, changes in thepermissible
age' for mandatory retirement,andchanges in the structure and coverage of
private pension programs. If, on the other hand, the parameters of the
utility function and. their distributions were known, we then would be in
a position to simulate the effects of programs with rules that would
result in kinks and bends in the budget line that have not asyet been
encountered. However, if parameters estimates obtained from a structural
modelareto be reliable enough for use in policy analysis, the structural
model must be specified correctly. This requires a full understanding of
the opportunity set available to each individual. According to the
evidence developed here, this opportunity set differsamong individuals,
especiallythe opportunities for partial retirement. n understanding
of how and why these opportunities differ is a key requirement forany
structural analysis of retirement behavior.40
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